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  1ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the effects of subnational identities on Euroskepticism, or 
opposition to the EU. It posits that citizens in federations are accustomed to balancing a 
subnational identity and a national identity and will be likely to support EU integration. 
This hypothesis is tested by gauging individual-level feelings on integration based on 
residence in a federal, quasi-federal, or unitary state. The results show that while 
federalism is positively correlated with multiple identities, individuals with a single 
identity who live in a federation are more Euroskeptic than their counterparts in unitary 
states. These findings suggest that federalism can either be a response to parochialism or 
that people in federations may resent the EU for allowing regions with secessionist 
movements autonomy from the central state.  
  2INTRODUCTION 
How viable is the European Union’s motto “United in Diversity”? To bring an 
“ever closer Union,” must European citizens discard their attachments to national and 
subnational levels of governance? Or does the EU reaffirm and empower regional forms 
of governance, and thus attachments to the regional level, as well as to the EU?  
These questions are compelling as European integration no longer relies solely on 
the dealings of elites operating on the basis of a “permissive consensus” from the public 
(Newman 2000). Rather, national leaders are increasingly using referenda to decide their 
countries’ positions regarding European treaties. Moreover, it seems that rising levels of 
“Euroskepticism” – contingent and/or outright opposition to the process of European 
integration (Taggart 1998) – is fracturing the dominant consensus supporting the 
European project (Newman 2000). 
The puzzle for scholars of European integration is why certain people are 
Euroskeptic while others support the EU (European Union). Competing theories to 
explain this divergence in support emphasize two distinct causal variables. First, the cost-
benefit approach claims that economic considerations (e.g., Gabel 1998) are the primary 
determinant for individual level support for the EU. Second, the identity theory posits 
that whether one possesses a single nation-state based identity, an exclusive identity, or 
multiple identities (Hooghe and Marks 2005) will determine whether or not individual 
supports European integration. For example, someone who identified only with his or her 
nation-state has an “exclusive” identity and would be less likely to support the EU, 
whereas another person who identified with his or her nation-state as well as Europe 
would have multiple identities and would be more likely to support the EU. While this 
  3theory may seem tautological, one should be careful not to confound identification with 
the EU with support for the EU.  
Recent empirical work emphasizes that variables measuring identity explain more 
variation in support or opposition to European integration than economic variables (e.g., 
McLaren 2002; Carey 2002). This paper amends this identity-based theory to encompass 
the influence of institutional design. Namely, it probes the “exclusive” identity theory, or 
“postfunctional theory” of European integration (Marks and Hooghe 2005), to consider 
the possible effects of federalism on Euroskepticism. It seeks to answer two questions: 
1.  Do people living in federations have more inclusive or exclusive identities? 
2.  Does federalism affect Euroskepticism through its relationship to exclusivity of 
identity? If so, in what way? 
Initially, this inclusion of federalism might appear anti-theoretical. Yet, upon closer 
inspection, the causal mechanisms underpinning Hooghe and Mark’s “postfunctional” 
theory of European integration, the purpose of governance and the demands of multi-
level governance, renders the consideration of federalism sound. To fortify this claim, 
this paper will briefly delineate this portion of Hooghe and Marks’ theory.  
The concept of governance is critical for the Hooghe and Marks theory; they 
envision governance as serving two purposes. The first rationale is functional—
governance is a means for coordinating action to provide public goods—while the second 
is psychological—governance is an expression of community. Regarding the latter 
purpose, Hooghe and Marks state:  
Citizens care—passionately—about who exercises authority over them. 
The challenge for a theory of multi-level governance is that the functional 
need for human cooperation rarely coincides with the territorial scope of 
community. Communities demand self-rule, and the preference for self-
  4rule is almost always inconsistent with the functional demand for regional 
authority (2005a, emphasis mine).  
 
What is critical for the ensuing analysis is this emphasis on an individual’s preference for 
who governs him or her.  
I will amend their analysis to consider how federalism influences a) the 
inclusiveness or exclusiveness of identity and b) explore whether federalism, a contextual 
feature, explicitly conditions the effect of exclusiveness, an individual feature, on 
Euroskepticism. The driving logic of this analysis is cultural (Bednar and Page 2006). 
Specifically, citizens living in a governmental arrangement in which authority is 
distributed to multiple levels are already accustomed to the demands of multi-level 
governance. Thus, the addition of a new layer of authority such as the EU might be easier 
to absorb for those who have experienced life in a federal state.  
One reason for this relative alacrity is that the provision and redistribution of 
public goods is most easily solved or accepted when citizens have a sense of 
identification with the other recipients of goods. Primarily, issues of allocation are 
inherent in all federations: how should public goods be allocated in a way that pleases 
members of all subunits (Bednar 2005)? To ensure a federation’s performance, people 
must not balk at the redistribution of funds to other subunits. Allocation is most easily 
accomplished when citizens in one subunit have a sense of connection to those in other 
subunits. In other words, to fulfill the first requirement of governance, the provision of 
goods and services, people must concur with King Ludwig I’s observation: “We want to 
be Germans and to remain Bavarians.”  
The previous themes connect with the second purpose of governance: the 
expression of community. Often, federations are institutional responses to strong feelings 
  5of identification among members of strong subnational territorial groups. Stepan deemed 
these federations as “holding-together” (1999). In these instances, center units must strive 
to acquire loyalty and sense of attachments from their citizens. Spain is the apotheosis of 
this type of federation. Other federations, like Germany, exemplify Stepan’s other 
characterization of federations as instances of “coming-together.” These subunits are 
willing to covenant with one another for functional reasons (Elazar 1987). 
In turn, the causal mechanism I emphasize in my consideration of federalism, the 
cognitive capacities and behavioral repertoires of those living within a federation, falls 
under the rubric of a larger theory that analyzes the relationship between culture and 
institutions. Undoubtedly, culture influences the performance of institutions and 
institutions affect the culture in which they are placed
i. If institutions create behavioral 
regularities and these regularities transmit institutional externalities (Bednar and Page 
2005), then members of a community who are already governed at multiple levels and 
juggling multiple identities will adapt quickly to the demands of another tier of 
government.  That is, feedbacks between institution and culture exist. A country that 
already exhibits a culture of federalism will adapt quickly to the new institutional 
arrangement of the EU, which emphasizes regional governance.  
These multiple levels of governance can affect conceptions of national identity. 
For instance, Carey elaborates on one conceptualization of national identity that is based 
on the attachments of individuals to various territorial entities (2002). Carey defines the 
highest political unit to which an individual feels an allegiance as the terminal 
community, an idea originally posited by Karl Deutsch (1966). Based on this idea, Carey 
claims that “When the concept of terminal community is combined with the idea that it is 
  6the duty of the state to represent its citizens, we can see a link between individuals’ 
perceptions of their terminal community and their opinions about the actions of various 
government actors” (2002, 392).  Yet individuals residing in a federal state are 
accustomed to being governed by multiple levels of government, not just those actors at 
the highest or terminal level. 
To investigate these claims, I use data from Eurobarometer 54.1. Using an 
ordered probit, I test whether or not there is a relationship between exclusivity of identity 
and federalism. The second model will explore whether federalism conditions the effect 
of exclusiveness of identity on Euroskepticism. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the following section, I present my hypotheses. 
Section 3 includes a description of the variables in the analysis, specifically my two 
variables of theoretical interest. Furthermore, I justify my coding of federalism. 
Specifically, I elaborate on why I emphasize the structural features of a federation and 
use a system similar to the one by Bednar (2005). Section 4 is devoted to an analysis of 
the models, while Section 5 entails a discussion of these results and implications for 
future research. 
HYPOTHESES 
This logic implies two hypotheses, one regarding the effect of federalism on the 
exclusivity of identity, and the other on how federalism influences feelings of 
Euroskepticism. 
Hypothesis 1: Federalism and inclusive identities are positively correlated. 
There are two possible effects of federalism. The first is that federalism can exert a 
centrifugal dynamic (Duchacek 1970; Nuñez 2000). Where ties to the center unit are 
strained, and the sense of community is strong only at the regional level, a person’s 
  7identity could be more exclusive. Furthermore, members of subunits without a 
historically strong regionalist movement may develop nationalist tendencies as a result of 
federalism
ii. The second, opposite effect is that federalism creates greater national 
solidarity. As Duchacek indicates, “emotional identification with the territorial authority 
has often had an artificial beginning” (1970, 31). Therefore, in situations where subunits 
“come together” for functional reasons, such as to increase economic efficiency, it is 
more likely that an individual will have multiple identities.  Finally, in order for a 
federation to be successful, there needs to be identification among individuals to their 
subunits and the center (Bednar Forthcoming).  In this paper I argue that the second effect 
prevails in Europe. 
My second hypothesis relates to how federalism influences feelings of 
Euroskepticism.  
Hypothesis 2: People living in a federation will be less Euroskeptic than people 
who reside in centralized systems. 
Europeanization, and more broadly, globalization, has threatened the traditional modes of 
governance (Kaldor 1996; Bjarnadottir and Gadzinowski 2004). In response, European 
Union practices and structures emphasize regional forms of governance. First, the 
subsidiarity principle established that the regional level is the most appropriate level of 
European organization. Not only is it closer to citizens, but it is more competent at 
handling political issues than traditional nation states (Bjarnadottir and Gadzinowski 
2004, 2). Second, regional governments receive and apply structural funds that aim to 
reduce wealth disparities, as well as implement agricultural policies and environmental 
policies (Hughes, Sasse and Gordon 2002; Hix 2005 [1999]). Magone reports that “By 
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European regional policy” (2003, 4). Furthermore, regions are represented in Brussels 
through the Committee of Regions (CoR). Subnational groups have been represented in 
Brussels since the 1970s. The Commission has always consciously sought the 
involvement of regional interests in the initiation, adoption and implementation of 
regional, while regional interests have made the most of the opportunity to bypass 
national governments, many of which were cutting back on national regional spending 
(Hix 2005[1999]). The creation of this committee by the Maastricht Treaty formalized 
their involvement in EU policy-making (Hix 2005 [1999]).  
The CoR has true political clout, although it is not as substantial as the European 
Parliament (Bjarnadottir and Gadzinowski 2004). For instance, the CoR is consulted on 
all  policy areas that have implications for economic and social cohesion. Finally, 
representatives of regional and local governments serve on the CoR, and most are placed 
on the committee by subnational bodies, such as by the German lander (Hix 2005[1999]). 
My second hypothesis states that people in federations are less Euroskeptic because EU 
practices function along regional lines, federations have the infrastructure to implement 
EU-level policies, and in areas with strong historical identities, the EU allows the region 
to circumvent the nation state. For example, Magone cites that “Apart from Catalonia, 
Basque Country, and Galicia, Spanish regional civil societies are still quite marginalized 
in the decision-making process of structural funds” (2003, 24). Interestingly, the Spanish 
constitution grants the regions of the Basque Country, Galicia, and Catalonia special 
statuses as ‘historical nationalities.’ In this capacity they were recipients of a different 
  9and ‘faster’ procedure for achieving full autonomy, as well as a higher level of power 
(Nuñéz 2004, 126). 
DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Using Eurobarometer Survey 54.1 (EB 54.1, November/December 2000), I employ 
two ordered probit models measuring exclusivity of identity and Euroskepticism. 
Conducted in November and December of 2000, it includes samples of approximately 
1000 randomly selected respondents in all 15 EU member states, with the exception of 
Luxembourg
iii.  
All regressions employ robust standard errors to account for the lack of 
independence of respondents within each country. One available strategy for this type of 
situation is to implement a fixed effect model, meaning the model includes dummy 
variables for each country. Yet with a fixed-effect model, one can only generalize to the 
particular unit (Bowers and Drake 2005). While I do not deny that the effects of 
federalism vary by country, I am searching to establish the existence of a relationship 
between federalism and exclusive identities, and federalism on the impact of exclusive 
identities on Euroskepticism. Thus, using the fixed effects model indicates that any 
analytic leverage we gain on the general role of federalism on identity and 
Euroskepticism is lost. For this theoretical reason, I forgo the fixed-effect model. 
Dependent Variables 
The dependent variable of my first model is “Exclusivity of Identity” and the 
second is “Level of Euroskepticism.” I will describe the construction and measurement of 
each in turn. 
Exclusivity of Identity  
  10I argue that the strength of one’s attachment to the subnational level does not 
impinge on subsequent levels of identity. Unfortunately, the principal Eurobarometer 
question that taps this concept does not include subnational identities. Faced with this 
problem earlier, Marks (1999) created an index of multiple/exclusive identity from a 
question regarding attachment, which I implement and alter slightly, omitting responses 
regarding “town/village.” In this question, respondents are asked how attached they are 
“town/village,” “region,” “country,” and “Europe.” The possible responses are, “Not at 
all attached,” “Not very attached,” “Fairly attached,” and “Very attached.” The responses 
are measured on an ordinal scale, ranging from 1, “Not at all attached” to 4, “Very 
attached.”  
To measure “exclusiveness,” I use Marks’ method of summing the differences 
between the highest responses and the lowest responses (1999).  
Figure 3.1 
 
() ( ) 2 1 Response Lower  - Response Highest  Response Lower  - Response Highest  + = eness Exclusiviv  
  Thus, answers can range from 0, when one feels equal attachments to all levels, to 6, 
when one is only attached to a single territorial community. For instance, if a person only 
feels attached to his country, he would rate his attachment to “country” as 4, and consider 
his feelings for his region and Europe as a 1. This person would have an exclusive 
identity and would be coded a 6. On the other extreme, a person could feel “very 
attached” to her region, country, and Europe, rating her feelings a 4 for each level. She 
would be 0 for the purpose of this index.  
While this operationalization of “exclusiveness” utilizes the only Eurobarometer 
questions linked to regional identities, it does obfuscate some important relationships
iv. 
  11For instance, a person designating all 1’s to each level could end up in the same category 
as the person who is “very attached” to all three.  To understand fully what this 
operationalization measures, I tabulated all the possible combinations of responses.  After 
tallying all the combinations of responses, there are no respondents who felt completely 
unattached to any level of governance.  In light of the operating definitions, I consider 
these respondents as having multiple identities. That is, their positive feelings toward 
their region or country did not correspond with strong feelings for Europe. Those who 
were 0’s and 1’s displayed more cumulative patterns: they also felt strongly about 
Europe. Finally, respondents in the 5 or 6 categories displayed an attachment to one level 
and one level only.  
These results suggest the following way of conceiving the responses: 
 
[Table 3.1 about Here] 
The summary statistics on the variable indicate that the mean value of exclusiveness is 
1.32, with a standard deviation of 1.19. 
Euroskepticism 
The second dependent variable is the level of skepticism a respondent feels toward the 
EU. The relevant question is the following:  
Generally speaking, do you think that your country’s membership of the European 
Union is a good thing, bad thing or neither good nor bad? 
The response “a good thing” was coded as 1, “neither bad nor good” as 2, and “a bad 
thing” as 3. Thus, Euroskepticism increases as the scores to the responses become higher.  
Federalism and Structural Constraints 
  12In both models, federalism is a key independent variable; however, 
operationalizing federalism poses methodological difficulties stemming from its 
conceptualization. Most definitions emphasize the federalism is a process that structures 
the distribution of authority between the center and the subunits (e.g.,  Filippov, 
Ordeshook, and Shvestova 2004, Rodden 2004). Attempts to capture this process 
encompass a variety of measurement schemes, including the dichotomization of unitary 
and federal states (Rodden 2004). Such a simple measure would misconstrue the complex 
institutional arrangements that are present in Europe. Thus, I chose to follow Jonathan 
Rodden’s advice: “...any attempt to measure federalism should be carefully calibrated to 
the theoretical argument of interest" (492). 
In this vein, Hooghe and Marks emphasize issues of governance to explain why 
national identities can pose barriers to integration; these theories of governance and 
identity are critical in understanding the logic for considering federalism’s role in 
conditioning Euroskepticism.  As Bednar states, “It is the combination of independence 
and direct governance that make federalism unique: the citizens have a relationship with 
their government that is complete, with mutual influence between the people and the 
government at each level" (Bednar Forthcoming, 25). In federations, the territorial bases 
of human communities dictate the size and placement of jurisdiction lines (Hooghe 
2003). Westphalian nation-states were frequently political constructs built upon these 
territorial bases. Often, federalism was a response to these groups’ demands for self-
governance, which, in turn, kept the state together. In fact, the cohesion is by design: 
federal constitutions makes exiting the federation costly and includes numerous safe-
guards to prevent subunits from seceding (Bednar Forthcoming). Even in the worst of 
  13situations of relations between the center and a subunit, the center will not terminate its 
relationship with the subunit, but rather alter the quality of it.  
These theoretical considerations correspond with the three structural components 
of a federation that Bednar proposes, as well as her coding scheme. The structural 
components of a federation include: geopolitical division, in that territory must be 
divided into mutually exclusive jurisdiction and. the constitution must recognize these 
entities and they cannot be abolished by the center; independence, meaning the center and 
the subunits have independent bases of authority; and direct governance, such that 
“Authority is shared between the state and the national governments: each governs its 
citizens directly, so that each citizen is governed by at least two authorities” (Bednar 
2005). 
  Thus, for a state to be coded as federal, it must fulfill these structural 
requirements. A quasi-federation does not have an exhaustive division of territory 
(excluding a federal district that acts as the seat of the center). A unitary state fails to 
meet all three of the requirements. Table 3.2 indicated my coding of the member states. 
[Table 3.2 About Here] 
Control Variables 
 By implementing robust standard errors, I can test the hypothesized relationships 
in the presence of both individual- and group-level control variables without causing bias 
in standard errors due to over counting the true number of degrees of freedom. 
Conversely, ignoring the clustering of errors in each country inflates the degrees of 
freedom available and render hypothesis testing on coefficients too liberal (Bowers and 
  14Drake, 2005). Adjusting for the true degrees of freedom signifies that I have 13 degrees 
of freedom in each of my models
v.   
With a limited number of degrees of freedom allowed due to clustering, I 
judiciously selected the most theoretically sound control variables in both models.  These 
control variables capture the socio-economic situation in which the respondents find 
themselves, their interest in politics, and their feelings of national identity (e.g., Gabel 
1998, Carey 2002, McLaren 2002). The summary statistics for each variable are 
presented in the appendix.  
Socialization Theory of Identity Formation 
The socialization theory of identity formation stresses that experience with 
national and supranational institutions influence the way that a social identity forms 
(Klandermans et. al. 2004). I use similar measures that social psychologists Klandermans, 
Sabucedo and Rodriguez (2004) use to measure the inclusiveness of identification of 
Galician and Dutch farmers.  
One such measure is the respondent’s evaluation of the quality of democracy in 
her country. If the democratic institutions within a country are viewed as suspect or 
inefficient, it is probable that a citizen is loath to identify with it. Klandermans et. al. 
(2004) posit that those with higher evaluations of democracy in their own country will 
have higher levels of inclusiveness.  
While the previous variable draws on the respondents’ experiences with their 
national institutions, knowledge of EU institutions  variable taps into respondents’ 
experiences with supranational institutions. This variable also gauges the respondents’ 
political cognition, which is theorized as facilitating multiple identities. The literature 
  15predicts that those with higher political cognition and know about European policies and 
institutions will have multiple identities.  
This variable is also included in the Euroskepticism model. Respondents who 
understand the EU, its policies and its institutions will be less likely to view it as a 
mysterious force negatively affecting their lives. I expect a negative relationship between 
knowledge and Euroskepticism.   
Functional Theory of Identity Formation 
The functional theory of identity formation maintains that one’s attachment can 
be seen as a function of economic expectations (Klandermans et. al. 2004). Two variables 
measuring personal economic expectations and national economic expectations are 
included in the model, as well as the Euroskepticism model. I can reasonably expect a 
positive relationship between personal economic expectations and multiple identities, as 
well as a positive relationship between national economic expectations and multiple 
identities.   
These variables have strong theoretical support for their inclusion in models of 
European support. Gabel and Whitten (1997) found that individuals consider both their 
personal economic expectations, as well as that of their country, when evaluating the 
European Union. Thus, a negative evaluation of both individual and national economic 
fortunes should be related with a high degree of Euroskepticism.  
Income is included in the identity model. The process of European integration has 
increased the investment opportunities for the wealthy, while constrained welfare 
spending of member states. For these reasons, I expect a negative relationship between 
  16income and identity, with people with higher income having multiple identities and those 
with lower incomes having exclusive identities.  
Euroskepticism Model 
I include two demographic variables in my model:  gender and education. I 
control for gender as there has been a gender gap in support of the EU.  Women are less 
likely to support European integration as their position in the labor market makes them 
vulnerable to neoliberal processes (Carey 2002; Nelsen and Guth 2000). The gender 
variable is a dichotomous variable, with female as the reference category, and male 
assuming a value of 1. I expect a negative relationship between gender and 
Euroskepticism.  
Educational attainment factors into the inclusiveness of one’s identity and 
individual level support for the EU.  Inglehart posits a positive correlation between 
cognitive mobilization and support for the European Union (1970, 1971). With respect to 
the Euroskepticism dependent variable, I predict a negative relationship between 
education and Euroskepticism.  
Support for the EU in a member state also depends on whether respondents feel 
that their member state benefits from its membership in the Union. In this vein, the fiscal 
transfer variable measures whether a member state is a net donor of funds or a net 
recipient of structural funds, calculated as the average net fiscal transfers per country as 
percentage of GDP over the period of 1995-2000. This is a structural variable that will 
theoretically influence individual attitudes so that people are more Euroskeptic as the 
average net fiscal transfer decreases.  
  17  I have also included a term that interacts blue collar workers and gross national 
income. Market liberalization affects different sectors of the labor market in various 
ways; I include manual workers in this model as they have been particularly vulnerable, 
especially with the enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe. More importantly, their 
plight is especially salient, given that it is often politicized and invoked by pervading 
radical right populist parties (e.g., Norris 2005). Conversely, manual workers in poorer 
member states will not be adversely affected, as trade liberalization hurts those whose 
skills are scarce and benefits those whose skills are abundant (Hooghe and Marks 2004). 
Respondents who are skilled or unskilled manual workers or non-desk employees were 
coded as 1. I interacted this with the gross national income in 2003, measured in the value 
of American dollars in 2001. I expect manual workers in rich countries to be more 
Euroskeptic, whereas manual workers in poorer countries are less Euroskeptic.  
RESULTS 
 
  Federalism and Exclusive Identity: Empirical Tests 
I apply an ordered probit to analyze the relationship between multiple identities 
and federalism. This nonlinear model is an appropriate way of estimating the relationship 
given that the dependent variable is categorical and there is an underlying order to the 
responses. The χ
2 statistic evaluates the overall fit of the model; notably, it is statistically 
significant (p < .001). Table 4.1 shows the ordered probit estimates. The probability of 
seeing this coefficient for “federalism” purely by chance is less than 5%. The coefficient 
is also negative, which supports the hypothesis that identities become more inclusive as 
the level of structural decentralization increases.  
[Table 4.1 About Here] 
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coefficients mean little on their own. The substance of nonlinear models of categorical 
variables lies in the marginal changes of a variable. A method to derive these 
probabilities is to look at the predicted probabilities of being classified into the possible 
outcomes of identity for various levels of federalism and then take the differences 
between the outcomes. I hold the other variables at their means. Table 4.2 clearly shows 
that the probabilities are decreasing for all three categories of federalism. Note that the 
probability of having the most inclusive identity is highest for respondents living in a 
federation. This suggests that the hypothesis between an inclusive identity and federalism 
holds.  
[Table 4.2 About Here] 
Graph 4.1 presents a snapshot of the six possible outcomes. This visual representation 
suggests that the probability of falling into categories 3, 4, 5, and 6, or having a more 
exclusive identity, are much lower than being classified a 0, 1, or 2, or having inclusive 
identities.  
[Graph 4.1 About Here] 
These graphs suggest a relationship between more inclusive identities and 
political decentralization. Table 4.3 of this section makes this intuition explicit. The 
marginal changes between a unitary state and a federation are consistently larger than 
between a quasi-federation and a unitary state.  
[Table 4.3 About Here] 
While I cannot gauge whether federalism causes inclusive identities given that 
this analysis is restricted to one discrete time period, these results suggest that federal 
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federalism is such that it decreases the probability of an exclusive identity. These results 
corroborate hypothesis one: federalism and inclusive identities are associated. 
Federalism, Identity, and Euroskepticism: Empirical Tests 
In the next model, I include an interaction term of “exclusiveness of identity” and 
“federalism” to examine whether federalism explicitly conditions the effects of 
exclusiveness of identity on Euroskepticism. The principal hypothesis in this section is 
that people who live in a federation will be less Euroskeptic than citizens of a centralized 
system. A competing hypothesis envisions federalism as an institutional response to 
parochialism, which may make one emphasize local identities more than any others
vi. 
Devolution of power may also whet the desire of citizens in historical units for more 
autonomy. In these situations, sub-units without strong identities may resent these areas 
and the EU, whose regional form of governance allows regions to circumvent the center. 
Thus, federalism could make people with exclusive identities even more Euroskeptic than 
they would have been in a unitary or quasi-federal state. 
The results from the second model are displayed in Table 4.4 below. While the 
values of these coefficients are meaningless on their own, the signs on the control 
variables accord with the existing theories. The one exception is that while manual 
workers are unlikely to support the EU, the p-value indicates that it is unlikely that this 
sentiment is conditional on income.   
[Table 4.4 About Here] 
Regarding the principal variables of analysis, we first notice that exclusiveness has a 
positive relationship with Euroskepticism. As predicted, federalism does not influence 
  20Euroskepticism on its own. The effect of exclusivity on Euroskepticism, however, 
appears to be conditioned by federalism. Moreover, this effect is positively correlated 
with Euroskepticism.  
Graph 4.5 shows the changes to support for the EU in different institutional 
settings, with the other values held at their means or modal values
vii.  
[Graph 4.5 About Here] 
The influence of federalism on the exclusivity of identity is largest for those 
individuals with either inclusive identities or exclusive identities. Nevertheless, the effect 
is larger for exclusive identities as the probability a person with an exclusive identity of 6 
will support the EU drops from 40% to roughly 30% in a federal state.   
[Graph 4.6 About Here] 
 
For all scores of exclusivity of identity, federalism hardly influences the probability of 
responding that EU membership is neither good nor bad. Furthermore, the probability is 
low, hovering just below 20%.   
[Graph 4.7 About Here] 
Graph 4.7 plots the predicted probabilities of being opposed to membership in the 
EU for specific values of exclusiveness, and along varying types of federalism. We can 
see that the more inclusive one’s identity is, the less influence federalism has on the 
predicted probability of being a Euroskeptic. Moreover, as the level of political 
decentralization increases, the probability of being opposed to the EU decreases for those 
with inclusive identities. For individuals with a high level of exclusivity federalism 
increases the probability of being Euroskeptic. This trend holds for those with an 
exclusive identity of 5, multiple identities of 4, and, to a lesser extent, multiple identities 
of 3. Generally the slopes for multiple identities and exclusive identities are steeper than 
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multiple identities and with multiple identities to be more Euroskeptic than those with 
similar identity profiles in unitary states.  
[Table 4.5 About Here] 
Table 4.5 supports what Graph 4.7 indicated: The influence of federalism is largest on the 
highest and lowest scores of exclusivity. Note that the change in probability of 
considering integration a good thing for those who have an exclusive identity of 6 
decreases 11% when comparing a unitary state to a federal state. The predicted 
probability of not being Euroskeptic decreases by 8% for those with an exclusive identity 
score of 5 as they move from a unitary state to a federal state. The only positive shift 
associated with federalism is for those with inclusive identities. Here we see that for 
every shift the predicted probability of considering the EU as a good thing increases, but 
only by increments of 5% and 3%, respectively. 
[Table 4.6 About Here] 
Finally, Table 4.6 shows the change in predicted probabilities of being 
Euroskeptic for shifts in federal structures. Federalism influences those who scored a 0 on 
“exclusive identity” by decreasing the predicted probability of being a Euroskeptic. The 
change from a unitary state to a federation is -4%.  
Interestingly, federalism has the greatest influence on those with the most 
exclusive identities. The predicted probability of being Euroskeptic increases by 12% for 
those living in a federal state, as compared to those living in a unitary state. In fact, while 
the predicted probabilities always increase in the final column, they are getting larger as 
  22the score on exclusivity rises. This suggests that federalism exacerbates Euroskepticism 
among those who already have exclusive identities.  
ANALYSIS 
  These results indicate that the second hypothesis was incorrect: federalism 
increases the effect of Euroskepticism. These findings contradict my theory and suggest 
the following explanation. Since federalism is often the response to the demands made by 
those with strong subnational identities, the devolution of power may only whet the 
subunits appetite for more independence. After all, centers are reluctant to break the 
relationship it has with its subunits. This commitment to the union by the center may 
decrease the level of attachment citizens feel for it. 
These findings also hint that parochialism may increase in federal states with 
significant autonomy. These growing attachments to the subunit and antipathy toward the 
center unit do not always occur among historical regions, such as the Basque Country or 
Scotland.  The Italian case demonstrates such a trend. In June 1990, Rome passed Law N. 
142, which, among other things, elevated the regions to a position of superiority vis-à-vis 
the provinces (Bull 1999). Despite the passage of this law, not all regions were satisfied. 
Various “special” regions, or those with an extended amount of autonomy due to the 
presence of considerable ethnic minorities or separatist tendencies, requested federalist 
reform. In February 1991, one of the “ordinary” regions, Northern Emilia-Romagna, also 
requested a new type of regionalization that would have given the regions more authority 
(Bull 1999, 152). 
Yet why would those with strong subnational identities feel no attachment for 
Europe? In the case of regions with strong secessionist movements, would not the EU 
  23appear as a way to free themselves from the grip of the central state? These findings are 
also surprising in light of the method of dispersal of cohesion funds. The EU doles out 
aid by subunit, which implies that those in the subunit would feel more positively toward 
the EU. Federal subunits have already set-up lobbies in Brussels to acquire more funds 
and units in federal states already have the administrative infrastructure to implement the 
funds effectively. Nevertheless, those with the most exclusive identities, held by 
respondents attached to only one level of territory, were the ones among whom federal 
structures had the most influence.  
FUTURE RESEARCH AND CONCLUSION 
These findings illuminate several future paths of research. The first would be a 
control for historical regions. Does federalism have any effect on individuals who are not 
in units with a strong regional identity? By controlling for historical units, we could 
discover whether or not federalization allows for people to think of themselves in more 
than national terms and to develop the mental frameworks necessary for multi-level 
governance.  
Another possibility would be to find better survey data that asks respondents 
directly whether they think of themselves as “subnational identity,” “national identity,” 
and “European.” Including such a variable would allow researchers to operationalize 
inclusive/exclusive identities with more precision. Similarly, country-by-country analysis 
could replace the multinational data from Eurobarometer
viii.  
Finally, these findings indicate that exclusivity of identity is linked to a broader 
phenomenon that describes sentiments of Euroskepticism: cosmopolitanism and 
particularism. Specifically, the new particularism could be a type of defensive 
  24nationalism. Encompassing exclusive and multiple identities in a theory of 
cosmopolitanism and new nationalism would allow us to keep the analytical leverage 
identities gives us on Euroskepticism, while allowing us to include information gleaned 
from theories of cognitive mobilization (Inglehart 1970; Janssen 1991) and values 
(Inglehart 1977). Most importantly, this new theory would account for the role of 
subnational identities, and how various identities interact with one another.  
The goal of this project was to assess how structural variables conditioned 
exclusivity of identity, and to investigate whether federalism conditioned Euroskepticism 
through the inclusiveness/exclusiveness of identity. The results indicate that the first 
relationship holds, but federalism does not make people less inclined to be Euroskeptic. 
In fact, those with exclusive identities in federations will be more likely to be Euroskeptic 
than those with exclusive identities in unitary states. These findings suggest that the 
relationship between multiple/inclusiveness of identity and Euroskepticism is not a 
simple, linear-additive one. Simply put, multiple identities do not always guard against 
Euroskepticism.  
  25APPENDIX 
Summary Statistics of Control Variables 
“Gender” is a dichotomous variable, with female as the reference category. The median is 
1. “Education” is measured by the age of the respondent when he stopped full-time 
education and is recoded on a four point scale. 1 corresponds with up to 15 years, 2 with 
between 16 and 19 years, 3 with 20 or more years, and 4 with still studying. The mean is 
2.67 and the standard deviation is 0.88. The mean value for “fiscal transfers” is 0.49 and 
the standard deviation is 1.49. This value ranges from -5.6 for Germany to 3.88 for 
Greece. “Income” is a Eurobarometer variable on a harmonized scale; values range from 
1 to 98. The mean is 33.32 and the standard deviation is 41.16. For the “evaluation of 
quality of democracy in country,” respondents were asked, “On the whole, are you very 
satisfied (4), fairly satisfied (3), not very satisfied (2) or not at all satisfied(1) with the 
way democracy works in (OUR COUNTRY)?” The mean is 2.67 and the standard 
deviation is 0.78. For “knowledge of EU institutions,” the Eurobarometer asks 
respondents to place themselves on a scale of 1-10 regarding “how much do you feel you 
know about the European Union, its policies, its institutions.” 1 signifies “know nothing 
at all” while 10 means that the respondent believes that he or she “know a great deal.” 
The mean is 4.75 and the standard deviation is 1.99. For “personal economic 
expectations,” respondents were asked: “What are your expectations for the year to come 
when it comes to the financial situation of your household: worse (1), same (2) or better 
(3)?” The mean is 2.16 and the standard deviation is 0.17. For “national economic 
expectations,” Eurobarometer asked, “What are your expectations for the year to come: 
will 2001 be better (3), worse (1) or the same (2) when it comes to the economic situation 
  26in (OUR COUNTRY)?” The mean is 2.01 and the standard deviation is 0.7. For 
“persuade friends,” the relevant Eurobarometer question is “When you hold a strong 
opinion, do you ever find yourself persuading your friends, relatives or fellow workers to 
share your views? Does this happen: never (1), rarely (2), from time to time (3), or often 
(4)?” The mean is 2.47 and the standard deviation is 0.95. 
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i This claim is inspired by the Bednar and Pages’ (2006) game-theoretical work on culture that attributes the 
emergence of behavioral regularities, or culture, to a member of a cultural group’s exposure to a set of 
incentives, institutions, and her own cognitive constraints. 
ii The classic case is Valencia in Spain. For instance, in 2004 the Basque country and Catalonia requested 
Euskara and Catalan to be given the status of official languages. This request prompted the Valencian 
  31                                                                                                                                                 
regional government to challenge the proposal because Valenciano, which is almost exactly the same as 
Catalan, is not included as a language in its own right. This is just one example of how latent identities, in 
this case Valencian, have emerged after the introduction of the Estado de las Autonomias (Nuñez 2000).   
iii My reasons for choosing this data set are two-fold. First, both Hooghe and Marks (2004) and Carey 
(2002) utilize this data set in their tests on the influence of national identity on attitudes towards the EU. 
Second, I did not include a survey with the ascension states on theoretical grounds, as I did not want to 
include countries whose history with democracy has been brief. 
iv Díez Medrano and Gutiérrez (2001) criticize this measurement for only capturing the relative level of 
identification, not the absolute level for a respondent. Data constraints, however, means that this question is 
the best one available to explore these issues.  
v Degrees of Freedom = (# Macro Units- 2). 
vi Inglehart (1977) proposes this hypothesis, stating that people who identify with regional governments are 
parochials, and thus, opposed to the European Union. 
vii I estimate the relationship for a male who is not a manual worker, as there are more respondents who 
fulfill this description in the sample. Of the 12,887 respondents, only 26% (3,391) are manual workers.  
viii I did not choose this research strategy simply because I was investigating whether there was any 
relationship between federalism and Euroskepticism. While no generalizable theory may be available, I 
wanted to tell a story that escaped country-specific explanations. 
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Table 3.1 
Code Interpretation  Modal  Response 
 
0 
 
Inclusive 
Region = 4 Country = 4 
Europe = 4 
 
1 
 
Inclusive 
Region = 4 Country = 4 
Europe = 3 
 
2 
 
Multiple Identities 
Region = 4 Country = 4 
Europe = 2 
 
3 
 
Multiple Identities 
Region = 4 Country = 4 
Europe = 1 
 
4 
 
Multiple Identities 
Region = 4 Country = 3 
Europe = 1 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
Exclusive 
Region =2 Country = 4 
Europe = 1 
Region = 4 Country = 2 
Europe = 1 
*Equal frequencies 
 
6 
 
Exclusive 
Region = 1 Country = 4 
Europe = 1 
 
Table 3.2 
Unitary State = 0  Quasi-Federation =  1 Federal State = 2 
France Italy  Austria 
The Netherlands  The United Kingdom  Belgium 
Luxembourg   Germany 
Denmark   Austria 
Ireland   Spain 
Greece    
Portugal    
Finland    
Sweden    
 Table 4.1 
Independent Variables  Coefficients  Robust Standard Errors 
Federalism -.12**  (.04) 
National Economic Expectations  -.09***  (.02) 
Personal Economic Expectations  -.03**  (.02) 
Income -.00*  (.00) 
Evaluation of Quality of Democracy  -.14***  (.02) 
Knowledge of EU Institutions  -.02*  (.01) 
τ
1 -1.32  
τ
2 -.59  
τ
3 .21  
τ
4 .89  
τ
5 1.61  
τ
6 2.06  
LR χ2   56.49   
Log Likelihood   -18885.54   
N 12887   
p> χ
2 0.00 
*p≤ .10   **p≤ .05  ***p≤ .01  
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 Table 4.2 
Predicted Probabilities of Ordered Probit Models, All Other Values 
Held at Means or Modes. 
Outcome Unitary  Quasi-Federal  Federal 
0 0.27  0.32  0.36 
1 0.28  0.28  0.29 
2 0.27  0.25  0.24 
3 0.12  0.11  0.09 
4 0.04  0.04  0.03 
5 0.01  0.01  0.00 
6 0.00  0.00  0.00 
 
Table 4.4 
 
Independent Variables  Coefficients  Robust Standard Errors 
Federalism -.07**  (.09) 
Exclusive Identity   .07**  (.03) 
Federalism/Exclusive Identity 
Interaction 
-.03** (.03) 
Fiscal Transfer as Percentage of GDP  -.19**  (.06) 
Knowledge of EU Institutions  -.09***  (.01) 
Gender -.11**  (.04) 
Tries to Persuade Friends  -.08***            (.02) 
GNI  -.02            (.01) 
Manual Worker (Dummy)  .25**            (.09) 
Manual Worker and GNI  -.00            (.00) 
Education  -.06**            (.02) 
National Economic Prospects  -.19***            (.03) 
Personal Economic Prospects  -.05**            (.02) 
τ
1 -1.47  
τ
2           -1.043   
LRχ
2         738.07 
Log-Likelihood     -11705.05 
N = 12,887 
p> χ
2 0.00 
*p≤ .10   **p≤ .05  ***p≤ .01 
  Table 4.3 
 
Marginal Changes in Political Devolution 
Outcome From  Unitary  State  to 
Quasi-Federation 
From Quasi-Federation  
to Federation 
From Unitary State to 
Federation 
0  0.04 0.04  0.08 
1  0.01 0.00  0.01 
2  -0.01 -0.01  -0.01 
3  -0.03 -0.03  -0.06 
4  -0.01 -0.01  -0.02 
5  -0.002 -0.001  -0.003 
6  0.00 0.00 -0.00 
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Table 4.5 
 
Marginal Changes of Federalism, Euroskepticism = 1 
Identity 
Change 
from 0 to 1 
Change 
from 1 to 2 
Change 
from 0 to 2 
0 0.03  0.03  0.05 
1 0.01  0.01  0.03 
2 -0.00  -0.00  -0.00 
3 -0.04  -0.01  -0.06 
4 -0.03  -0.03  -0.06 
5 -0.04  -0.04  -0.08 
6 -0.06  -0.05  -0.11 
 
Table 4.6 
Marginal Change of Federalism, Euroskepticism = 3 
Identity
Change 
from 0 to 1 
Change  
From 1 to 2 
Change  
from 0 to 2 
0 -0.02  -0.02  -0.04 
1 -0.01  -0.01  -0.02 
2 0.00  0.00  0.00 
3 0.04  0.01  0.06 
4 0.03  0.03  0.06 
5 0.04  0.04  0.08 
6 0.06  0.06  0.12 
 
 